The Battle Of Adwa(1896 Ethiopia-Italo war)

The Battle of Adwa was fought on 1 March 1896 between the Ethiopian Empire and the Kingdom of Italy near the town of Adwa, Ethiopia, in Tigray. It was the climactic battle of the First Ethiopia-Italo War, securing Ethiopian sovereignty.

As the 20th century approached, most of Africa had been carved up among the European imperialist powers. The two independent exceptions were the young Republic of Liberia on the west coast of the continent and the Ethiopian Empire in the strategic Horn of Africa. The newly unified Kingdom of Italy was a relative newcomer to the colonial scramble for Africa. Italy had recently obtained two African territories namely Eritrea and Somaliland. Both were near Ethiopia on the Horn of Africa and both were impoverished. Italy sought to improve its position in Africa by conquering Ethiopia and joining it with its two territories.

In 1889, the Italians signed the Treaty of Wuchale with then Negus Menelik of Shewa. The treaty ceded territories previously part of Ethiopia, namely the provinces of Bogos, Hamasien, Akkele Guzay, Serae, and parts of Tigray. In return, Italy promised Menelik’s rule, financial assistance and military supplies. A dispute later arose over the interpretation of the two versions of the document. The Italian-language version of the disputed Article 17 of the treaty stated that the Emperor of Ethiopia was obliged to conduct all foreign affairs through Italian authorities. This would in effect make Ethiopia a protectorate of the Kingdom of Italy. The Amharic version of the article however stated that the Emperor could use the good offices of the Kingdom of Italy in his relations with foreign nations if he wished.
However, the Italian diplomats claimed that the original Amharic text included the clause and that Menelik knowingly signed a modified copy of the Treaty.

The Italian government decided on a military solution to force Ethiopia to abide by the Italian version of the treaty. As a result, Italy and Ethiopia faced off in what was later to be known as the famous First Italo-Ethiopian War. In December 1894, Bahta Hagos led a rebellion against the Italians in Akkele Guzay, in what was then Italian controlled Eritrea.
Units of General Oreste Baratieri’s army under Major Pietro Toselli crushed the rebellion and killed Bahta. The Italian army then occupied the Tigrayan capital, Adwa. In January 1895, Baratieri’s army went on to defeat Ras Mengesha Yohannes in the Battle of Coatit, forcing Mengesha to retreat further south.

By late 1895, Italian forces had advanced deep into Ethiopian territory. On 7 December 1895, Ras Makonnen, Ras Welle Betul and Ras Mengesha Yohannes commanding a larger Ethiopian group of Menelik’s vanguard annihilated a small Italian unit at the Battle of Amba Alagi. The Italians were then forced to withdraw to more defensible positions in Tigray, where the two main armies faced each other. By late February 1896, supplies on both sides were running low. General Oreste Baratieri, commander of the Italian forces, knew the Ethiopian forces had been living off the land, and once the supplies of the local peasants were exhausted, Emperor Menelik’s army would begin to melt away. However, the Italian government insisted that General Baratieri act.

On the evening of 29 February, Baratieri, about to be replaced by a new governor, General Baldissera, met with his brigadiers Matteo Albertone, Giuseppe Arimondi, Vittorio Dabormida, and Giuseppe Ellena, concerning their next steps. He opened the meeting on a negative note, revealing to his brigadiers that provisions would be exhausted in less than five days, and suggested retreating, perhaps as far back as Asmara. His subordinates argued forcefully for an attack, insisting that to retreat at this point would only worsen the poor morale. Dabormida exclaiming, “Italy would prefer the loss of two or three thousand men to a dishonorable retreat.” Baratieri delayed making a decision for a few more hours, claiming that he needed to wait for some last-minute intelligence, but in the end announced that the attack would start the next morning at 9:00. His troops began their march to their starting positions shortly after midnight.

The Italian army comprised four brigades totaling 17,978 troops, with fifty-six artillery pieces. However, it is likely that fewer fought in the actual battle on the Italian side: Harold Marcus notes that “several thousand” soldiers were needed in support roles and to guard the lines of communication to the rear. He accordingly estimates that the Italian force at Adwa consisted of 14,923 effectives. One brigade under General Albertone was made up of Eritrean askari led by Italian officers.
The remaining three brigades were Italian units under Brigadiers Dabormida, Ellena and Arimondi. While these included elite Bersaglieri and Alpiniunits, a large proportion of the troops were inexperienced conscripts recently drafted from metropolitan regiments in Italy into newly formed “d’Africa” battalions for service in Africa. Additionally a limited number of troops were drafted from the Cacciatori d’Africa units of local Italian settlers.

Estimates for the Ethiopian forces under Menelik range from a low of 73,000 to a high of over 120,000, outnumbering the Italians by an estimated five or six times. The forces were divided among Emperor Menelik, Empress Taytu Betul, Ras Wale Betul, Ras Mengesha Atikem,Ras Mengesha Yohannes, Ras Alula Engida, Ras Mikael of Wollo, Ras Makonnen Wolde Mikael, Fitawrari Gebeyyehu, and Negus Tekle Haymanot Tessemma. In addition, the armies were followed by a similar number of traditional peasant followers who supplied the army, as had been done for centuries.

Most of the army was composed of riflemen, a significant percentage of which were in Menelik’s reserve; however, there were also a significant number of cavalry and infantry only armed with lances.

On the night of 29 February and the early morning of 1 March three Italian brigades advanced separately towards Adwa over narrow mountain tracks, while a fourth remained camped. However, the three leading Italian brigades had become separated during their overnight march and at dawn were spread across several miles of very difficult terrain. Their sketchy maps caused Albertone to mistake one mountain for Kidane Meret, and when a scout pointed out his mistake, Albertone advanced directly into Ras Alula’s position.

Unknowing to General Baratieri, Emperor Menelik knew his troops had exhausted the ability of the local peasants to support them and had planned to break camp the next day on 2 March. The Emperor had risen early to begin prayers for divine guidance when spies from Ras Alula, his chief military advisor, brought him news that the Italians were advancing. The Emperor summoned the separate armies of his nobles and with the Empress Taytu beside him, ordered his forces forward. Negus Tekle Haymanot commanded the right wing, Ras Alula the left, and Rasses Makonnen and Mengesha the center, with Ras Mikael at the head of the Oromo cavalry, the Emperor and his consort remained with the reserve. The Ethiopian forces positioned themselves on the hills overlooking the Adwa valley, in perfect position to receive the Italians, who were exposed and vulnerable to crossfire.

Albertone’s askari brigade was the first to encounter the on rush of Ethiopians at 6:00, near Kidane Meret, where the Ethiopians had managed to set up their mountain artillery. Albertone’s heavily outnumbered askaris held their position for two hours until Albertone’s capture, and under Ethiopian pressure the survivors sought refuge with Arimondi’s brigade. Arimondi’s brigade beat back the Ethiopians who repeatedly charged the Italian position for three hours with gradually fading strength until Menelik released his reserve of 25,000 Shewans and swamped the Italian defenders. Two companies of Bersaglieri who arrived at the same moment could not help and were cut down.

Dabormida’s Italian brigade had moved to support Albertone but was unable to reach him in time. Cut off from the remainder of the Italian army, Dabormida began a fighting retreat towards friendly positions. However, he inadvertently marched his command into a narrow valley where the Oromo cavalry under Ras Mikael slaughtered his brigade, while shouting Ebalgume! Ebalgume!(“Reap! Reap!”). Dabormida’s remains were never found. The remaining two brigades under Baratieri himself were outflanked and destroyed piecemeal on the slopes of Mount Belah. Menelik watched as Gojjamforces under the command of Tekle Haymonotmade quick work of the last intact Italian brigade. By noon, the survivors of the Italian army were in full retreat and the battle was over.

The Italians suffered about 9,600 killed and 5,800 wounded in the battle and subsequent retreat back into Eritrea, with 12,000 taken prisoner; Ethiopian losses have been estimated around 1,000–,1,500 killed and 1,000 wounded.

In their flight to Eritrea, the Italians left behind all of their artillery and 11,000 rifles, as well as most of their transport. As Paul B. Henze notes, “Baratieri’s army had been completely annihilated while Menelik’s was intact as a fighting force and gained thousands of rifles and a great deal of equipment from the fleeing Italians.” The 12,000 Italian prisoners, who included General Albertone, appear to have been treated as well as could be expected under difficult circumstances, though about 200 died of their wounds in captivity.

However, 1300 captured askaris, regarded as traitors by the Ethiopians, had their right hands and left feet amputated. Augustus Wylde records when he visited the battlefield months after the battle, the pile of severed hands and feet was still visible, “a rotting heap of ghastly remnants.” Further, many had not survived their punishment, Wylde writing how the neighborhood of Adwa “was full of their freshly dead bodies; they had generally crawled to the banks of the streams to quench their thirst, where many of them lingered unattended and exposed to the elements until death put an end to their sufferings.” Many Italian prisoners were castrated hence Baratieri was relieved of his command and later charged with preparing an “inexcusable” plan of attack and for abandoning his troops in the field. He was acquitted on these charges but was described by the court martial judges as being “entirely unfitted” for his command.

Emperor Menelik decided not to follow up on his victory by attempting to drive the routed Italians out of their colony. The victorious Emperor limited his demands to little more than the abrogation of the Treaty of Wuchale. In the context of the prevailing balance of power, the emperor’s crucial goal was to preserve Ethiopian independence. In addition, Ethiopia had just begun to emerge from a long and brutal famine, the army was restive over its long service in the field, short of rations, and the short rains which would bring all travel to a crawl would soon start to fall. At the time, Menelik claimed a shortage of cavalry horses with which to harry the fleeing soldiers.

As a result of the defeat, Italy signed the Treaty of Addis Ababa, recognizing Ethiopia as an independent state. Almost forty years later, on 3 October 1935, after the League of Nations’s weak response to the Abyssinia Crisis, the Italians launched a new military campaign endorsed by Benito Mussolini, the Second Italo- Abyssinian War. This time the Italians employed vastly superior military technology such as tanks and aircraft, as well as chemical warfare, and the Ethiopian forces were defeated by May 1936. Following the war, Italy occupied Ethiopia for five years (1936–41), before eventually being driven out during World War II by the Ethiopian patriot force.

The defeat of Italy by Ethiopia at Adwa was a fundamental turning point in Ethiopian history, on a similar note, the Ethiopian historian Bahru Zewde observed that “few events in the modern period have brought Ethiopia to the attention of the world as has the victory at Adwa”.

“This defeat of a colonial power and the ensuing recognition of African sovereignty became rallying points for later African nationalists during their struggle for decolonization, as well as activists and the Pan-African movement” as a Pan-Africanist Ejike Iloduba explained. On the other hand, many writers have pointed out how this battle was a humiliation for the imperialist Italian military and the Europeans in general. One student of Ethiopia, Donald N. Levine, points out that for the Italians Adwa “became a national trauma which demagogue leaders strove to avenge. It also played no little part in motivating Italy’s revanchist adventure in 1935”. Levine also noted that the victory “gave encouragement to isolationist and conservative strains that were deeply rooted in Ethiopian culture, strengthening the hand of those who would strive to keep Ethiopia from adopting modern techniques and resistances with which both Menelik and Ras Teferi/Haile Selassie contended with”.

By Ejike Iloduba @Pan African Liberation Movement – palmhttps://m.facebook.com/panafricanliberationmovement?_e_pi_=7%2CPAGE_ID10%2C1870716091

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